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Abstract
This article presents a conceptual framework of social justice for 
library and information science (LIS) and services responsive to 
their core concerns and drawing from the disciplinary literatures in 
both philosophy and LIS. The framework is introduced in terms of 
the multifaceted concept of informational justice, defined as the just 
treatment of persons as seekers, sources, and subjects of informa-
tion. The article also expands on the central aspect of informational 
justice, namely iDistributive justice, defined as the equitable distri-
bution of access to information. An iDistributively just system is one 
that ensures all persons have sufficient access to information, where 
access is understood as a capability sensitive resource.
Introduction 
The profession of librarianship has long had a social ideal at its core. At 
the founding meeting of the American Library Association (ALA) in 1876, 
the library was praised as an “instrument always working in the direction 
of moral and social development” (Garrison, 1979, p. 35). With the ALA’s 
adoption of the “Library Bill of Rights” in 1939, protecting intellectual 
freedom and fighting censorship developed into a “professional impera-
tive” (Wiegand, 1999, p. 11). More recently, the profession has expanded 
its scope beyond the confines of the library itself. In 1990 the ALA adopted 
the “Policy on Library Services to Poor People” (Holt & Holt, 2010, p. 14), 
calling for, among other things, promoting equitable access, public aware-
ness, and public policies to aid those who are poor (ALA, 2014). These 
social ideals are encompassed and extended in current discussions of so-
cial justice within the LIS professions (Britz & Blignaut, 2001; Dadlani & 
Ross, 2014; de la Peña McCook, 2001; Duff, Flinn, Suurtamm, & Wallace, 
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2013; Gilliland, 2011; McMenemy, 2012; Mehra, Rioux, & Albright, 2010; 
Pateman & Vincent, 2012; Usherwood, 2011). In order for this trend in 
LIS to have its promised impact, however, there is a strong need for LIS to 
develop its own understanding of social justice. This article addresses this 
challenge by developing a practical account of social justice for LIS that is 
relevant in the twenty-first century.
The term social justice is resonant with a number of positive associa-
tions—e.g., fairness, equality, inclusion, and diversity. The concept it-
self, however, remains undertheorized. As Rioux (2010) points out, “few 
studies of LIS are explicitly guided by established social justice theories” 
(p. 10). Philosophers have developed the most sophisticated accounts of 
social justice, so it is natural to look to philosophical theories for guidance 
(Mehra et al., 2010; Rioux, 2010). It is not clear, however, how useful it is to 
simply apply to issues in LIS a theory of social justice developed elsewhere. 
While such established theories must be brought into the conversation, 
they may not speak directly to the particular concerns of LIS professionals. 
The approach taken here is to pull from various philosophical accounts of 
social justice to help in developing a relevant framework of social justice 
for LIS in terms of what this author calls informational justice. 
The theory of social justice for LIS starts with its historical roots in 
philosophical theories of social justice. These provide an understanding 
of how LIS professionals and scholars are using the idea of social justice in 
their work. Using these conceptual resources,1 a multifaceted character-
ization of social justice is developed. This characterization highlights two 
features of a social justice orientation (an institutional focus and an ethic 
of care, solidarity, and respect) and three elements of social justice (dis-
tribution, participation, and recognition). The second part of the article 
describes a framework of social justice for LIS in terms of informational 
justice, defined as justice for persons and communities in their activities as 
seekers, sources, and subjects of information. 
The final part of the article focuses on one aspect of informational jus-
tice—justice for persons as seekers of information. As such, all persons 
deserve an equitable share of information resources, what is called here 
iDistributive justice. While information equity (Lievrouw & Farb, 2003) is 
often held up as a goal for LIS (see, e.g., Kranich, 2001), it is not a straight-
forward matter to define what is meant by an “equitable share” of informa-
tion. If social justice is to be a goal in the LIS professions, then we must 
have a way to assess to what extent we are achieving this goal. In order to 
do that, we need to specify the goal more precisely by asking two questions: 
(1) What is being distributed? and (2) What is a just distribution? Drawing 
from philosophical theories of distributive justice, the answers to these 
two questions form the foundation for the related concept of iDistributive 
justice. It will be argued that the focus of iDistributive justice should be on 
ensuring access to information as a capability sensitive resource, while un-
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derstanding access as relational and multifaceted. It is also argued that a 
just distribution of access to information is one in which every person has 
sufficient access to exercise his or her basic capabilities. 
A Note on Methodological Approach
This article is a philosophical inquiry into the nature of social justice in the 
context of information systems and services. As such, it draws on literature 
from both LIS and philosophy in articulating a conceptual framework of 
informational justice that can be applied in a wide range of LIS settings 
and contexts. The discussion presented here emerges from applying a 
methodological approach of philosophical research. Such an approach 
is similar to the stance employed by numerous philosophers throughout 
history and referred to in this article, e.g., John Rawls, David Miller, Iris 
Marion Young, Nancy Fraser, Martha Nussbaum, and Amartya Sen. It in-
volved intensive and close reading of these and other theorists, and the 
application of critical and contextual thinking to the core concerns of 
justice, information, and society. Based on the resulting analysis, various 
new terms and definitions were constructed, conceptual frameworks were 
developed, and justifications for these definitions and frameworks were ar-
ticulated. The intent of this article is to present background information, 
develop the framework, and lead the reader through the reasoning for the 
framework. The intention is for the work to provide valuable theoretical 
and conceptual tools that will help LIS professionals think more clearly 
about social justice and act more mindfully and deliberately as social jus-
tice advocates as a result. 
Philosophical Accounts of Social Justice
While philosophical discussion of the concept of justice goes back to at 
least Plato (Kamtekar, 2001) and Confucius (Chan, 1994), the term “social 
justice” is relatively new. The Jesuit Priest Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio (1793–
1862) is credited with having introduced the term in the mid-nineteenth 
century (Miller, 1999). In the late nineteenth century, social justice be-
came a topic of discussion among philosophers and social critics. At that 
time political theorists, such as John Stuart Mill, were responding to chal-
lenges to classical liberal theory posed by communist and socialist theories 
(Miller, 1999). The first book-length treatment of the topic, Westel Wil-
loughby’s Social Justice: A Critical Essay (1900), conceived of social justice 
as a critical project that reveals the “discrepancies in many places between 
the ethical ideals actually held, and the social and economic conditions 
really existing” (p. 7). 
Adding the adjective “social” to “justice” emphasizes the fact that so-
ciety as an entire system may be evaluated on the basis of whether it is 
just. As Miller (1999) puts it, “Social justice requires the notion of a soci-
ety made up of interdependent parts, with an institutional structure that 
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affects the prospects of each individual member.” (p. 4). Philosophical 
accounts of social justice focus on what is termed the “basic structure of 
society,” including the “political constitution, and the principle social and 
economic arrangements” (p. 4). The feminist political philosopher Iris 
Marion Young (2011) takes an even broader view, stating that social justice 
“concerns all aspects of institutional organization, public action, social 
practices and habits, and cultural meanings.” (p. 9). The subject of social 
justice, then, is the entire social system. Social justice requires us to ask big 
questions about the existence of injustices in the economic, political, and 
cultural spheres. 
The continuing Catholic tradition of social justice adds a personalist 
ethic that aspires to treat every person as part of the human family (de la 
Peña McCook, 2001). In an address on social justice (2006), Pope Bene-
dict XVI called for respect for both the needs and rights of individuals and 
“genuine solidarity that commits people to live and work always for one 
another and never against or to the detriment of others.” The importance 
of solidarity and the value of human connections of care are emphasized 
in a number of more communitarian philosophies, including the Feminist 
Ethic of Care (Noddings, 2013) and the African philosophy of Ubuntu 
(Murithi, 2006). Combining both of these perspectives, a social justice 
orientation includes both an understanding of social justice as a matter 
of social institutions and an ethic of solidarity, care, and respect for indi-
vidual persons and communities within these institutions. 
In contemporary political philosophy the term “social justice” is often 
used synonymously with distributive justice (Miller, 1999, p. 2; Young, 2011, 
chap. 1), which is contrasted with retributive justice. While retributive jus-
tice (also called correctional justice) is concerned with appropriate punish-
ment for violations of law or morality, distributive justice is concerned with 
the just distribution of goods among the members of a society (Velasquez 
& Clair, 1990). Philosophical theories of social justice concern the just 
distribution of what the political philosopher John Rawls (1971) calls “the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (p. 4). Philosophers disagree 
about what should be distributed (Brighouse & Robeyns, 2010); should 
we be concerned with the distributions of satisfaction of preferences, or 
resources, or capabilities? Philosophers also disagree about what a just 
distribution should look like (Lamont & Favor, 2013); should goods be dis-
tributed according to desert, equally, so as to create greatest benefit to the 
least well-off, or so that everyone has a sufficient amount? In the section 
of this article on iDistributive justice, these various theories of distributive 
justice will be discussed in detail. 
Some philosophers, most notably Iris Marion Young (2011), have ar-
gued that the distributive paradigm of social justice is too narrow. Young 
defines social justice as “the elimination of institutionalized domination 
and oppression” (p. 16). She argues that social justice not only concerns 
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the distribution of benefits and burdens among members of a society but 
also the ways in which persons are depicted in “cultural imagery and sym-
bols” (p. 20). Some of the latter, such as racist, classist, or sexist imagery, 
can prevent us from recognizing all persons as equally valuable and worthy 
of respect. 
Nancy Fraser’s (2001) conception of social justice combines these two 
aspects of social justice. These aspects of social justice can be called, follow-
ing Fraser, distributive and recognitional justice. According to Fraser, 
What is needed is a broad and capacious conception [of justice], which 
can accommodate at least two sets of concerns. On the one hand, such 
a conception must encompass the traditional concerns of theories of 
distributive justice, especially poverty, exploitation, inequality, and class 
differentials. At the same time, it must also encompass concerns re-
cently highlighted in philosophies of recognition, especially disrespect, 
cultural imperialism, and status hierarchy. (p. 4)
In order to bring these two aspects of social justice together, Fraser pro-
poses a third aspect: what she calls the “principle of parity of participa-
tion,” requiring that “all members of the society interact with one another 
as peers” (p. 6). Fraser argues that a society lacking distributive or recog-
nitional justice will also lack participatory justice, and vice versa.
The Place of Social Justice in LIS
While some LIS scholars and practitioners only offer diffuse characteriza-
tions of social justice, a number of others provide precise definitions of the 
term adopted from their philosophical and historical origins and extrapo-
lated to varied LIS contexts. These echo philosophical concerns of social 
justice in terms of equity, participation, inclusion, diversity, institutions, 
commonality, and other areas as applied in LIS. According to Mehra et al. 
(2010), for example, a socially just society is one in which “individuals and 
groups are treated fairly and receive an equitable share of all the benefits 
in society” (p. 4820). Rioux (2010) gives a similar definition, but uses the 
term “equal” rather than “equitable” (p. 11). The notion of an equal or 
equitable share is most frequently mentioned in the literature and cap-
tures the concern with distribution. Morales, Knowles, & Bourg (2014) 
characterize social justice as including respect for diversity, inclusion, and 
“the ability of all people to fully benefit from social and economic prog-
ress and to participate equally in democratic societies” (p. 440). Singh 
(2014) points out that social justice concerns society-wide or institutional 
policy, defining social justice as “a policy of inclusion in which a society 
or institution provides all individuals with equal opportunities” (p. 50). 
Williams-Cockfield (2014) defines social justice as “the advancement of 
equality and commonality within a society that understands and values 
human rights.” 
 informational justice/mathiesen 203
Based on a survey of LIS articles referring to social justice, the au-
thor identified a number of key concepts and approaches. Social justice 
is characterized in various ways in the LIS literature; the following three 
strategies are the most typical: (1) categories of people or communities 
burdened with social injustice; (2) descriptions and definitions of social 
justice; and (3) strategies for achieving social justice within library and 
information services. The following provides a snapshot of both the range 
of approaches and the frequency with which they are used in the litera- 
ture. 
Works on social justice in LIS often specify persons and communities 
who are oppressed and disadvantaged2 due to their
•	 ethnicity	and/or	language	(Henderson,	1988;	Naidoo,	2014);
•	 race	(Dunbar,	2006);
•	 sexual	orientation	(e.g.,	Naidoo,	2014;	Vincent,	2012);
•	 gender	status	(e.g.,	female,	transgender,	intersex)	(Vincent,	2012);
•	 physical	ability	(e.g.,	Naidoo,	2014;	Hill,	2011);
•	 health	status	(e.g.,	Henderson,	1988);
•	 religion	(e.g.,	Naidoo,	2014);
•	 immigration	status	(e.g.,	Naidoo,	2014;	Vincent,	2012);
•	 age	(e.g.,	Vincent,	2012);
•	 income	level	and	housing	status	(e.g.,	Vincent,	2012).
Authors in LIS also describe social justice using such phrases and terms as
•	 freedom	(e.g.,	de	la	Peña	McCook,	2001;	Williams-Cockfield,	2014);	
•	 human	rights	(e.g.,	Samek,	2007;	Williams-Cockfield,	2014);
•	 dignity	and/or	agency	of	the	individual	(e.g.,	de	la	Peña	McCook,	2001;	
Duff et al., 2013);
•	 democracy	and/or	representation	(e.g.,	Duff	et	al.,	2013;	Mehra,	Al-
bright, & Rioux, 2006; Morales et al., 2014);
•	 inclusion	and/or	participation	(e.g.,	de	la	Peña	McCook,	2001;	Hecha-
varria, 2014; Morales et al., 2014; Singh, 2014);
•	 commonality,	 common	good,	and/or	community	 (e.g.,	Mehra	et	al.,	
2006; Rioux, 2010; Williams-Cockfield, 2014);
•	 diversity	(e.g.,	de	la	Peña	McCook,	2001;	Mehra	et	al.,	2006;	Morales	et	
al., 2014);
•	 equity	or	equality	(e.g.,	Dadlani	&	Ross,	2014;	de	la	Peña	McCook,	2001;	
Duff	et	al.,	2013;	Hechavarria,	2014;	Mehra	et	al.,	2006;	Morales	et	al.,	
2014;	Rioux,	2010;	Singh,	2014;	Williams-Cockfield,	2014).
Other authors focus on social injustice using terms such as
•	 poverty	and	homelessness	(e.g.,	Longstaff,	2011);
•	 discrimination	(e.g.,	Longstaff,	2011);
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•	 violence	and	hate	(e.g.,	Longstaff,	2011);
•	 oppression	(e.g.,	Duff	et	al.,	2013;	Dunbar,	2006).
The philosophy surrounding relevance of social justice in LIS is also 
varied. Some argue that it is not the job of librarians, archivists, and other 
information professionals to advocate for social justice, because our pro-
fessional obligation is to be neutral brokers of information (Greene, 
2013). The argument for professional neutrality says that LIS profession-
als ought not to give special status to particular points of view (e.g., those 
promoting particular social goals or conceptions of justice), but to provide 
a wide range of points of view (Mathiesen & Fallis, 2008). According to 
these neutralists, if LIS professionals take positions on social and political 
issues, they will undermine their ability to be seen as neutral brokers of 
information. By not favoring particular points of view, LIS professionals 
thereby serve all people no matter what information they are seeking. 
Through neutrality, LIS professionals thus express their equal concern 
for all patrons. 
This justification of neutrality, however, is anything but neutral—LIS 
professionals value neutrality because they value such things as equality, 
justice, and service. LIS is the discipline that seeks to design systems and 
services that link people to information. Public librarianship, for example, 
is based on the belief that doing so has a social value, because an informed 
citizenry is better than an uninformed one and a life with access to a rich 
array of information resources is better than one without such access. Thus 
the real question is not whether LIS professionals should be neutral, but 
when and whether neutrality actually serves these values and when it does 
not. Neutrality serves these values when, for instance, information profes-
sionals provide the same level of service to a person whose beliefs they 
violently disagree with as they do to those with whom they agree. It does 
not serve those values when we fail to attend to the ways in which libraries 
and other information services may be reinforcing the exclusion and mar-
ginalization of underserved populations. The author suggests that seeking 
social justice, then, is not antithetical to the true value of neutrality. 
The question arises, what is the unique role of libraries and librarian-
ship in the promotion of social justice? It is important to keep in mind 
the breadth of concerns about social justice. Social justice applies to all 
aspects of a person’s life, from her health to her ability to participate in 
political decision making to her opportunities for leisure. However, while 
it is necessary to keep social justice writ large in mind, the primary focus 
for LIS is on justice with regard to persons as seekers, sources, and subjects 
of information: what will be called here informational justice. What makes 
informational justice of central concern, and thus why libraries and other 
information services are particularly important, is the fact that informa-
tional injustice produces and reinforces other forms of social injustice, 
while information justice undermines systems of social injustice. Indeed, 
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informational justice serves as a good proxy for social justice writ large, 
because opportunities to receive and share information are central means 
for enhancing all aspects of people’s lives.
Need for a Multidimensional Account of Social 
Justice in LIS
Based on the above summary of social justice as it has been discussed 
in the disciplines of philosophy and LIS, a multidimensional account of 
social justice seems appropriate. As Rioux (2014) has pointed out, social 
justice is “a diverse concept without a universally-accepted definition” 
(p. 25). This suggests that it may be preferable to avoid providing a single 
definition of social justice for LIS, so as to avoid prematurely limiting its 
scope. Following this approach, a single unified definition of social justice 
is not provided here. Instead, based on the forgoing literature review, it is 
possible to isolate five features of a social justice approach as potentially 
relevant to the LIS professions; these include two essential components 
of a social justice orientation and three important foci of social justice in 
terms of their potential relevance to the LIS professions. 
Components of a Social Justice Orientation
•	 Institutional	perspective. Institutions, economies, and cultures can be un-
just without any individual person intentionally acting unjustly. A focus 
on social justice in LIS must keep in mind the importance of large 
structural and cultural forces and attend to how they shape the life 
prospects of individual persons and communities.
•	 Ethic	of	care,	solidarity,	and	respect. It matters how those concerned with 
social justice relate to their fellow human beings. A social justice ori-
entation in LIS approaches these issues with an attitude of care, soli-
darity, and respect for the individual human beings and communities 
involved.
Foci of social justice
•	 Distribution. The way in which institutions, economies, and cultures 
distribute goods (such as resources, opportunities, abilities) is socially 
constructed and should be evaluated in the LIS professions from the 
perspective of justice. 
•	 Participation. Social justice recognizes the agency of all persons and 
avoids treating people as passive recipients of assistance. All persons 
within the community should have a voice and influence within social 
systems and institutions that affect them, including the LIS professions.
•	 Recognition. Cultural imagery and symbols may create and reinforce 
structures of domination and oppression; thus we should attend to the 
ways in which persons and communities are represented within various 
cultural institutions, including LIS settings and contexts.
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Strategies for LIS to Promote Social Justice
A review of the literature in LIS on social justice shows a number of inter-
connected strategies for how libraries and other information services can 
(and often do) promote social justice.3 
•	 Creating	and	supporting	diversity	in	the	information	professions	(Mo-
rales et al., 2014). Example: The University of Arizona’s Knowledge River 
program	recruits	and	provides	financial	and	other	support	for	Hispanic	
and	Native	American	students	seeking	an	MLS	(Montiel-Overall	&	Little-
tree,	2010).	(For	more	examples	see	Morales	et	al.,	2014,	pp.	443–444.)
•	 Providing	information	resources	about	and	for	social	justice	and	social	
injustice (Jimerson,	2007;	Morales	et	al.,	2014).	Example:	Archives	and	
libraries devoted to the collection of information about human rights 
and	documenting	human	rights	violations	(Mathiesen,	in	press).	
•	 Treating people justly as seekers, sources, and subjects of information 
(Rioux,	Mehra,	&	Albright,	2007).	Example:	The	Protocols	for	Native	
American	Archival	Materials	set	out	principles	to	guide	ethical	steward-
ship of Native American cultural materials (Underhill, 2006).
•	 Using the voices and resources of library professionals and organizations 
to directly advocate for social justice locally and globally (Longstaff, 
2011). Example: The American Library Association has passed a num-
ber of resolutions supporting social justice legislation in such areas as 
immigrant rights (ALA, 2007), marriage equality (ALA, 2009a), and 
universal health care legislation (ALA, 2009b).
These four strategies can be seen as mutually supporting and enhanc-
ing the ability of LIS professionals and organizations to create a socially 
just society. Promoting diversity within LIS professions and organizations 
directly increases social justice in the society by increasing it within those 
professions and organizations. Creating a diverse workforce of informa-
tional professionals also creates an environment in which a diverse range 
of people are more likely to be treated justly in the provision of informa-
tion services. One way to treat people justly as seekers of information is to 
provide them with resources to learn about the existence of injustices and 
about what social justice is and how to fight for it. Finally, by promoting 
social justice in society in a direct fashion, the profession shows itself to be 
an engaged and progressive force in that society.
 While all four strategies are worthwhile, it can be said that the third—
treating people justly as seekers, sources, and subjects of information—is 
the core of what it means to be a socially just information professional or 
service. The rest of this article will focus on what it means to promote jus-
tice in the defining activities of LIS. The framework is introduced in terms 
of the multifaceted concept of informational justice that is defined as the 
just treatment of persons as seekers, sources, and subjects of information. 
The article also expands on the central aspect of informational justice, 
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namely iDistributive justice, defined in terms of an equitable distribution 
of access to information. An iDistributively just system ensures that all per-
sons have sufficient access to information, where access is understood as a 
capability sensitive resource. 
The Framework of Informational Justice
Informational justice is a multifaceted concept, reflecting the three ways 
in which persons may be related to information—as seekers, as sources, 
and as subjects. To be treated justly as a seeker of information, persons 
should have an equitable access to information: this is called iDistributive 
justice. To be treated justly as a source of information, persons should 
have an equal chance to contribute to the production and provision of 
knowledge: this is called iParticipatory justice. To be treated justly as a 
subject of information, persons should be fairly depicted in the overall 
information array: this is called iRecognitional justice.
Three Foci of Informational Justice
•	 iDistributive	justice. Information goods and information services should 
be equitably distributed among all members of the society.
•	 iParticipatory	justice. All members of the society should have opportuni-
ties to communicate their point of view alone or in concert with others, 
to have that point of view taken into account, and to take part in shared 
decision making about the provision of information resources. 
•	 iRecognitional	justice. Contents of information available within the infor-
mation environment should include fair and accurate representations 
of all members of the society.
The “i” has been added before each of the terms so as to highlight the 
context of information services and systems. In the rest of this essay, how-
ever, in order to promote readability, the “i” will often be dropped. The 
reader should keep in mind, however, that the terms “distribution,” “par-
ticipation,” and “recognition” will hereafter be used in their informational 
sense.
 As with distributive, participatory, and recognitional justice (Fraser, 
2001), iDistributive, iParticipatory, and iRecognitional justice are mutu-
ally reinforcing. An information system or service that promotes distribu-
tive justice will also contribute to participatory and recognitional justice. 
Conversely, an information system or service that is rife with participa-
tory and recognitional injustice is unlikely to be distributively just. Thus, 
it is important for libraries and other information services to consider all 
three types of informational justice. 
Information services and systems that are distributively just may contrib-
ute to participatory justice by providing persons with the informational re-
sources to develop and support their voices in public discussions. In addi-
tion, by providing equitable access to all, a distributively just environment 
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insures that a wide range of people are exposed to those points of view. 
Distributive justice thus contributes to recognitional justice by creating an 
information environment that is welcoming to all people and by providing 
the information necessary to correct false information and stereotypes.
Information services can support participatory	 justice by providing op-
portunities for marginalized individuals and groups to express themselves. 
Participatory justice may contribute to distributive justice by providing 
more sources of relevant information for the community and by giving 
all members of the community—particularly those whose interests are of-
ten neglected—a voice in the design and implementation of information 
services so as to ensure the relevance and effectiveness of those services. 
Recognitional	justice has recently become a central concern in librarian-
ship, as is evidenced by efforts to create more culturally competent profes-
sionals (Montiel-Overall, 2009) and to ensure that libraries avoid collecting 
children’s books that reinforce stereotypes (Naidoo, 2014). Recognitional 
justice contributes to distributive justice by creating information environ-
ments in which all can feel included and thereby more able to access the 
information they need. Recognitional justice contributes to participatory 
justice by undermining stereotypes that contribute to the silencing and 
ignoring of marginalized populations. 
A Focus on iDistributive Justice
iDistributive justice is defined as an equitable distribution of information 
goods and services. This still leaves the question of what counts as an “equi-
Figure 1. Relationship of mutual support between forms of informational justice.
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table” distribution. To answer this question, we need to delve more deeply 
into theories of distributive justice. A theory of distributive justice requires 
that we specify a good and a rule (Anderson, 2010, p. 81). The “good” re-
fers to the thing distributed, while the “rule” refers to how we determine 
the just distribution of the good. In the following subsection, two theories 
of goods are considered—the resource theory and the capability theory. It 
will be argued that we should think of the good of iDistributive justice as 
access to information, where access is understood as a capability enhanc-
ing resource. In the next section, various rules of equitable distribution 
are considered. It will be argued that we should adopt a sufficientarian 
rule of distribution, where sufficiency is determined by access to informa-
tion necessary for persons to exercise their fundamental capabilities. 
Theories of Distribution—What to Distribute?
There are three standard philosophical theories of what good(s) we 
should be trying to distribute equitably. 
Distribution	of	Preference	Satisfaction. This utilitarian approach is most of-
ten adopted by those working in economics and public policy. For the 
utilitarian, the good to be distributed is the total amount of pleasure, hap-
piness, or preference satisfaction that people (and perhaps other sentient 
beings) enjoy (Bentham & Mill, 2004). Preference utilitarianism, the view 
that we should seek to satisfy people’s preferences or desires, is a com-
monly assumed framework for assessing success in the supply of services. 
Suggested assessments of library service frequently couch preference sat-
isfaction in terms of “customer satisfaction” (Hernon & Whitman, 2001). 
There is, however, a serious problem with this approach when it is ap-
plied to environments in which there is poverty, discrimination, and op-
pression. Subjective evaluations of satisfaction are vulnerable to the dis-
tortion of adaptive	 preferences. Adaptive preferences are preferences that 
persons adopt based on their circumstances—they are adaptive to their 
environment, be it physical or social (Khader, 2011). Persons who have 
fewer opportunities due to a variety of social factors—such as racism, sex-
Figure 2. Theories of the Good.
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ism, poverty, or disability—may adapt their preferences to what they are 
likely to get (Burchardt, 2005). A woman in a sexist society, for instance, 
will likely lower her expectations for career success, and thus her prefer-
ences for advancement opportunities in her career will be more easily 
satisfied than those of her male peers. Thus a system that merely looks at 
preference satisfaction will likely get results that are skewed in ways that re-
inforce existing social inequities. For this reason, a less subjective account 
of the good is preferable. 
Distribution	of	Resources. Instead of considering whether people are satis-
fied, we can look at the resources they actually have. The most well-known 
resourcist theory is Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness,” presented in his 
seminal work, A	Theory	of	Justice (1971). Rawls called his list of resources 
“primary social goods” (“primary goods” for short). Primary goods in-
clude “rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth” 
(p. 92). According to Rawls, we can focus just on primary goods when 
considering distributive justice, because these goods allow persons to ac-
quire all sorts of other goods that they might want. As Rawls puts it, with 
primary goods, people “can generally be assured of greater success in car-
rying out their intentions and advancing their ends, whatever these ends 
may be” (p. 92). 
 It is plausible that access to information should also be included among 
the primary goods. Information is an essential all-purpose resource, much 
like income (van den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008). Rawls included both lib-
erties (and freedoms) and more tangible goods and services in his list of 
primary goods. Similarly, information as a primary good includes both 
a liberty aspect and a tangible good aspect. The first is the freedom or 
liberty to receive and communicate information; the second is the actual 
availability of information as a thing. It is important to make this distinc-
tion, because one could be free to have information in the sense that there 
are no laws limiting one’s access, while at the same time lacking actual ac-
cess to information because the informational resources are not available. 
In the context of LIS, this seems like the obvious account of the good to 
adopt—if we care about informational justice, then what other good could 
we be concerned with distributing other than information resources?
There are problems, however, with resourcist theories of the good. This 
was famously pointed out by Amartya Sen in his seminal paper, “Equal-
ity of What?” (1980). According to Sen, the problem with focusing on 
whether people have access to certain resources is that, depending upon 
one’s physical, mental, and social situation, the same set of resources can 
lead to very different outcomes. For example, take two people who have 
exactly the same resources. It may seem that the distribution between 
them is just. Suppose, however, that one person has a severe disability and 
that this disability requires expensive assistive devices to carry out everyday 
life tasks. In that case, even though both people have the same resources, 
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they do not get the same benefit from these resources. As Sen points out, 
this is not an unusual problem:
If people were basically very similar, then an index of primary goods 
might be quite a good way of judging advantage. But, in fact, people 
seem to have very different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic 
conditions, location, work conditions, temperament, and even body 
size (affecting food and clothing requirements). So what is involved is 
not merely ignoring a few hard cases, but overlooking very widespread 
and real differences. Judging advantage purely in terms of primary 
goods [or resources] leads to a partially blind morality. (pp. 215–216)
The sort of situation with which Sen is concerned arises frequently in the 
context of information services. Even when everyone can get information 
from their public library, for instance, they will vary in their ability to use 
and benefit from the information available. So, for example, a person who 
is	vision	impaired	will	not	be	able	to	get	the	information	s/he	needs	from	
the	resources	of	the	library	without	access	to	various	assistive	devices	and/
or resources in Braille. 
Distribution	of	Capabilities. As an alternative to the resource approach, 
Sen (1980) suggests that we measure not resources, but capabilities, i.e., 
the ability to do things. Capabilities would include such things as “the 
ability to move about” one’s environment, the ability “to meet one’s nutri-
tional requirements, the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered, [and] 
the power to participate in the social life of the community” (p. 218). As 
Rawls himself was at pains to emphasize, the reason resources are valuable 
is because they are all-purpose means that allow us to pursue our ends, 
whatever they may be. Sen takes this a step further. He points out that we 
care not so much about resources per se but about what we can actually 
do, experience, and be. So, our measure of distributive justice should be 
keyed to our abilities to function in these various ways that are important 
to us. 
 In the case of informational justice, Sen’s theory would have us look 
to whether the distribution of information resources and services is en-
abling people to engage in important life activities and states of being. So, 
for instance, he wouldn’t have us seek to measure how many computers 
we have, or how many people accessed the archives, or even how many 
people were satisfied with their experience. Rather, he would have us look 
for indicators of whether access to our services is helping people do and 
be what is important to them (Britz, Hoffmann, Ponelis, Zimmer, & Lor, 
2013; Hill, 2011). While the capability approach reminds us to focus on 
outcomes rather than resources, it is not clear that it provides a useful 
framework for LIS. How are LIS professionals and researchers to evaluate 
the levels of capabilities in a community? If we can determine the levels 
of capabilities, how do we know how library services impact upon them? 
The capabilities approach is a theoretical framework for evaluating the re-
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source distribution of an entire society. Trying to directly apply the theory 
of capabilities to LIS is unlikely to be a good fit. 
Distribution of Information Access—A Capability 
Sensitive Resource
Luckily, in order to specify the good of iDistributive justice, we do not need 
to resolve the debate between resource and capability theorists. This sec-
tion develops a theoretical framework that takes the insights of both theo-
ries into account. It is suggested here that access to information should 
be understood as a capability	sensitive	resource. This requires us to change 
our focus from thinking of information as the resource, to thinking of ac-
cess to information as the resource. It also requires that we define access in a 
way that incorporates the concerns raised by Sen about resource theories. 
The following definition of information access seeks to incorporate both 
of these features:
A	person	has	access	to	information	when	he/she	has	the	freedom	or	
opportunity to obtain, make use of, and benefit from that information. 
(Mathiesen,	2014,	p.	606)
A key feature of this definition is that it makes information access a rela-
tion	between	persons	and	information	(or	information	services/systems).	
Whether some information is accessible depends both on the state of the 
information and on the state of the person who seeks to access it. Thus 
one can make information accessible by changing either the condition of 
the information or the condition of the person who wishes to access the 
information. So, for example, if there is a website with information about 
a health condition and the person who needs this information does not 
have access to the Internet or the skills to use it, then this information is 
not accessible to her. In this case, the information can be made accessible 
by either providing a printed copy of the information to the individual, 
or by providing her with access to the Internet and training in how to 
navigate it. This relational account of access takes into consideration the 
differential capacities of persons to, in Sen’s words, transform resources 
into functionings. Thus this account of access is sensitive to the differences 
among persons in their abilities to benefit from information as a resource. 
Emphasizing the relational nature of information access makes it possible 
to identify the multidimensional nature of access. In determining whether 
information is accessible for some person or group, information profes-
sionals must consider the following five factors (Mathiesen, 2014): 
•	 Availability:	Does	the	needed	information	exist?	
•	 Findability:	Can	information	seekers	find	the	information?
•	 Reachability:	Can	the	information	seekers	actually	get	to	the	informa-
tion?
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•	 Comprehensibility:	Can	the	information	seeker	understand	the	infor-
mation?
•	 Usability:	Is	the	information	meaningful	or	useful	for	the	information	
seeker?	
 To the extent that any of these factors is missing or inadequate, a per-
son does not fully have access to information. Thus, when measuring dis-
tributive justice, we should look at whether individuals and communities 
have access to information along all of these dimensions. For each of these 
facets there are intellectual, physical, and sociocultural determinants of 
access (Burnett, Jaeger, & Thompson, 2008; Thompson & Afzal, 2011; 
Mathiesen, 2014, p. 609). Thus, when evaluating whether information is 
accessible, we should consider whether it is intellectually, physically, and 
socioculturally accessible. So, for example, some information may be intel-
lectually comprehensible, because the information seeker can understand 
the information presented, but at the same time it may not be physically 
comprehensible, because the information seeker has dyslexia. Informa-
tion may not be socioculturally comprehensible if it uses images and meta-
phors that do not speak to the cultural background of the information 
seeker.
To illustrate these dimensions, consider the barriers to access faced by 
poor people, as discussed in the American Library Association’s web page 
on Outreach Resources for Services to Poor and Homeless People (ALA, 
2014). First, there may be a problem with availability—information useful 
to this population may not exist. As the ALA points out, there may be a 
lack of “resources that address people’s experiences or current situations.” 
Figure 3. Access to information as a capability sensitive resource.
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Research has shown that information needed by poor people is under- 
produced, due to their small impact on the market for information (South-
well, Hamilton, & Slater, 2011). In order to solve the availability problem, 
LIS professionals and organizations may need to take an active role in 
publishing and distributing information (Koerber, 2014). Second, there 
may be problems with findability—this population may be underserved 
with resources to help them find relevant information. For example, a 
library may provide access to information that is of interest and relevant to 
the needs of poor persons, but due to staff members’ “prejudices against 
people who are poor or homeless” (ALA, 2014), these persons may not 
be provided with the resources, such as reference help, that they need to 
find the information they want. Third, even if they know where it is, the 
information may not be reachable—there may be specific barriers that 
poor people encounter in getting to the information. For example, such 
things as “library card or access policies requiring a permanent address” 
and “limited access to the library building by either limited means of trans-
portation or service hours” (ALA, 2014) make it more difficult for poor 
people to get to the needed resources. Fourth, the information may not 
be in a format or language that is comprehensible to the population. For 
example, given the lack of educational opportunities for poor persons, it 
may be that materials relevant to their life situations are not available in 
formats that they can understand. Fifth, the information they have access 
to may not be usable by this population. For instance, it is likely that infor-
mation targeted to middle-income persons will not be useful for those who 
are homeless or in poverty. Books on nutrition, for example, may recom-
mend foods that are too expensive or are not available at the stores in poor 
neighborhoods (Food Research and Action Center, 2013). 
What Is an Equitable Distribution? 
As noted in the first section of this essay, discussions of social justice in LIS 
frequently use the terms “equality” or “equity.” It is not so simple a matter, 
however, to determine what is an equal or equitable distribution of access 
to information. Indeed, there are a number of different philosophical 
theories of what constitutes an equitable distribution of goods. Below is 
a discussion of four rules of distribution prominent in the philosophical 
literature: maximizing, egalitarian, prioritarian, and sufficientarian. Ulti-
mately, a sufficientarian rule is defended as most appropriate for assessing 
whether the distribution of information access is equitable. 
Types	of	Rules
Rules of distribution are often divided into patterned and nonpatterned. 
Patterned rules look at the pattern of distribution across the population 
and suggest that certain patterns are more just than others. Nonpatterned 
rules of distributive justice suggest that we look instead at whether people 
have what they deserve based on their past contributions or based on rules 
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of property and exchange (Nozick, 1974). Nonpatterned theories do not 
necessarily hold that vastly unequal distributions are unjust, as long as 
the distribution is the result of the application of a just rule of resource 
transfer. Nonpatterned rules are difficult to apply (because they require 
looking at the history of how someone ended up with their current share 
of the resource) and are, therefore, not good contenders for a rule of 
iDistributive justice to be applied when assessing the justice of information 
services. Thus, the discussion here will focus on what are called “patterned 
rules” of distribution.
Patterned theories of justice can be divided into maximizing and egali-
tarian as shown in figure 4.
Maximization: The Maximum Amount of Good for the Maximum  
Number of People 
Maximization is often used in the evaluation of public services. As applied 
to information access, the maximization rule would require that we seek 
to achieve the greatest amount of access for the greatest number of peo-
ple. So, for instance, a maximizing rule would have us consider how many 
people are able to use the library computers or how many people are able 
to access an archive. While these are important indicators, if we only con-
sider the amount of resource available or the amount of usage the library 
gets, we may well be failing on the score of a just distribution of access. 
To see why this is the case, consider an important criticism of the maxi-
mizing approach, most famously made by Rawls (1971). Rawls argued that 
summing across different individuals and seeking to increase the total 
amount of a good “does not take seriously the distinction between per-
sons” (p. 27). Simply because there is more access overall does not mean 
that every person is getting his or her fair share of the resource. Indeed, 
policies that increase net gains overall may at the very same time seriously 
underserve certain segments of the population. For instance, in order to 
Figure 4. Rules of distributive justice.
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get more people in the library we may cater to certain segments of the soci-
ety—perhaps those who already have ample access to information through 
other venues. In short, it doesn’t matter only that we serve the most people 
possible, but that those who most need the services are getting them. This 
is something that the maximizing rule cannot take into account.
Egalitarianism: The Distribution Must Be Equitable 
Egalitarian rules are concerned not just with how many people get access 
but with how that access is distributed across the population. 
Strict Egalitarianism. As applied to information access, strict egalitarian-
ism (Nielsen, 1979) would require that everyone be provided with exactly 
the same level of access to information. Recall that access includes such 
factors as what is relevant and comprehensible to a person or group. Thus, 
for access to be equal, we would have to attend to the range of concerns 
and interests of all members of the community as well as their levels of 
literacy, etc. This may appear to capture quite well the idea of a just distri-
bution of information. There is, however, a widely acknowledged problem 
with the strict egalitarian rule: the “leveling down” problem (Brake, 2004). 
Egalitarianism requires that in cases where we are not able to bring every-
one up to the same level, we should “level down” or reduce the amount of 
resources held by those who have more in order to achieve equality. Thus 
egalitarianism seems to commit us to a policy under which, if we cannot 
give everyone exactly the same access, then we ought not to provide bet-
ter services for some than for others. Taken to the extreme, an egalitarian 
rule would require that if we cannot provide public libraries for all com-
munities, we ought not to provide them for any. It seems wrongheaded to 
deprive some people of resources simply because not everyone can have 
them. Furthermore, as prioritarians (Rawls, 1971) are quick to point out, 
leveling down can have bad consequences for those who are the least well-
off in the society. 
Prioritarianism. Rawls’s famous difference	principle is prioritarian; accord-
ing to the difference principle, the least well-off persons in the society have 
priority in the distribution (1971). The difference principle approach is 
egalitarian in spirit, but avoids leveling down. It allows some persons to 
have more than others, as long as that inequality has the overall tendency 
to improve the situation of the least well-off. As applied to iDistributive 
justice, the difference principle would permit a library to allow greater 
information access for certain members of the community if this leads to 
obtaining more funding that could be put into providing greater access 
for those less well-off. For example, the library might institute a fee-based 
service, the funds from which would go to improving the services for the 
poorest segment of its users. Getting more resources for the least well-
off, even if not equal resources, will overall tend to promote equality by 
empowering them. We might be concerned that a prioritarian rule is not 
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sufficiently egalitarian, however. Allowing greater resources to some mem-
bers of the community may reinforce the sense that some are “lesser” than 
others. For this reason, a prioritarian rule may not be the best principle of 
distribution for library and information services.
Sufficientarianism. Sufficientarianism is an egalitarian option that fo-
cuses on ensuring that all members of the community are guaranteed suf-
ficient access to information. Under the “sufficientarian” rule there is a 
minimal standard of access that must be met for everyone (Shields, 2012). 
The sufficientarian rule shows equal respect for all by setting an equal 
baseline below which none should be allowed to fall. Resources should be 
expended first on bringing up those who do not have a sufficient degree 
of access. Because the sufficientarian rule does not say what to do about 
those who have more than a sufficient amount, it does not run into the lev-
eling down problem. Because the sufficientarian rule just sets a baseline, 
it may be combined with any of the other rules. Once everyone has suffi-
cient access, we can adopt any of the other rules—prioritarian, egalitarian, 
or maximizing. Given these features of the sufficientarian rule, the theory 
of iDistributive justice presented here is sufficientarian.
Human	Rights	and	Capabilities	
The sufficientarian conception of justice is quite common in discussions 
of human rights, which set baseline standards of treatment owed to all 
persons. Martha Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities (2003) seeks to articu-
late those basic needs shared by all human beings and that are protected 
by human rights. Thus her list of capabilities (pp. 41–42) may be a good 
place to start reflecting on what information resources would be necessary 
for a sufficient level of access. The readers may wish to take the categories 
identified in Nussbaum’s (2003) following list as guidelines for the sorts of 
topics and skills on which library and information services should focus.
•	 Life:	“Being	able	to	live	to	the	end	of	a	human	life	of	normal	length;	not	
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth 
living” (p. 41). 
•	 Bodily	Health:	“Being	able	to	have	good	health,	including	reproductive	
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter” (p. 41).
•	 Bodily	Integrity:	e.g.,	 freedom	of	movement,	 freedom	from	violence,	
sexual freedom. 
•	 Senses,	 Imagination,	 and	Thought:	This	 includes	 “being	 able	 to	use	
one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression 
with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of reli-
gious exercise” (p. 41). 
•	 Emotions:	e.g.,	“to	love,	to	grieve,	to	experience	longing,	gratitude,	and	
justified anger” (p. 41).
•	 Practical	Reason:	“Being	able	to	form	a	conception	of	the	good	and	to	
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life” (p. 42). 
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•	 Affiliation:	e.g.,	having	close	relationships	and	being	 treated	with	re-
spect.
•	 Other	Species:	Relating	to,	e.g.,	“animals,	plants,	and	the	world	of	na-
ture” (p. 42). 
•	 Play:	e.g.,	athletic	and	other	recreational	activities.
•	 Control	Over	One’s	Environment:	This	includes	both	the	political	(e.g.,	
free speech, political participation) and material environment (e.g., 
privacy, employment). 
This list is presented as a starting point for reflection on what a sufficient 
level of access to information for every member of the community would 
look like. There is not space here to go through how each of the capa-
bilities could guide us in following a sufficientarian rule of distribution of 
information access. To illustrate how Nussbaum’s theory might be used, 
however, consider the capability of bodily integrity. Focusing on women 
in particular, this capability would be supported by access to information 
about such things as domestic violence, reproductive health, contracep-
tion, and sexuality. Nussbaum’s list is by design general and relatively ab-
stract, as the specifics must be filled in based on the culture and needs 
of the particular individuals and communities being served. Thus an es-
sential component of satisfying distributive justice must be engaging the 
participation of various communities in expressing their needs as informa-
tion seekers. 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that in many cases it will not be possi-
ble for a library or other information service to provide the informational 
resources necessary for persons to achieve a sufficient development and 
exercise of their capabilities. Here we may find useful the approach taken 
by the United Nations to such situations. The UN holds that states should 
work to “achieve progressively” those human rights that require resources 
that may be in short supply or take time to develop (Eide, 1995, p. 20). In a 
similar way, LIS professionals and institutions can seek to achieve progres-
sively a just distribution of information access.
Informational Justice in Practice
This article developed the concept of informational justice to provide LIS 
professionals with a framework for recognizing the central social justice 
issues within information services. While fully implementing this frame-
work must be left for future research, at this point some practical impli-
cations for the design and evaluation of LIS services and programs can 
be derived from the framework. To illustrate these practical implications, 
suggestions for possible programs or activities are given below. 
The first lesson that can be drawn from this framework is that when de-
signing programs and services, a social justice orientation requires making 
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ourselves aware of the social injustices imbedded in large institutional sys-
tems and cultural assumptions. It should be kept in mind that the nature 
of oppressive systems is to obscure their own existence and impact; thus 
constant questioning as to whom we might be leaving out of our definition 
of “community” is imperative. This institutional perspective, however, may 
lead to creating static categories that reduce people to simplistic social 
and cultural stereotypes. This is where the attitudinal aspect of the social 
justice orientation is important; a professional with a social justice orienta-
tion treats persons and communities with care, solidarity, and respect. The 
attitude of care fosters change through direct empathic relationships with 
those whom LIS professionals serve. Care alone, however, is insufficient 
as it may lead to an attitude of paternalistic superiority, which can dimin-
ish people’s sense of self-efficacy and agency. Thus the value of solidar-
ity—that is, seeing persons as equals and creating bonds of fellowship and 
community—is essential. Respect for individuals and communities recog-
nizes that they are self-determining; their intentions for themselves are 
more important than, and may outstrip, even the most well-intentioned 
outsider’s understanding. Activities supportive of a social justice orienta-
tion could include the following: instituting book or film groups that focus 
on works about and by underserved members of the community; inviting 
advocates from these communities to speak to staff; and encouraging staff 
to engage with communities outside the walls of the library. 
The second lesson that can be drawn from the framework is that creat-
ing services and systems that equitably distribute access to information 
among members of the community requires a nuanced understanding 
of the communities to be served. Given this, it is imperative to assess and 
evaluate the resources available to historically marginalized and disadvan-
taged members of the community, such as senior citizens, youth, persons 
with disabilities, and sexual, racial, linguistic, and ethnic minorities. Using 
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, LIS professionals could analyze whether 
their information service makes accessible materials that support the ca-
pabilities relevant to the mission of the service. The information-gather-
ing stage may require moving beyond reliance on some of the traditional 
methods for measuring services, such as gathering usage statistics or sur-
veying current patrons. Gathering only information about those currently 
using the information service does little to reveal what keeps some mem-
bers of the community from using the service. Furthermore, due to “adap-
tive preferences” those who are chronically underserved and marginalized 
in the community may not expect as much, and thus may be less demand-
ing than more privileged patrons. Qualitative methods, such as structured 
or unstructured open-ended discussions with underserved members of 
the community, may be more appropriate. It may be useful to use the five 
facets of accessibility (availability, findability, reachability, comprehensibil-
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ity, and usability) and the three determinates of access (physical, intellec-
tual, and sociocultural) to generate a list of questions that can be used as 
a frame for data collection. One question might be, for example, “What 
are the sociocultural barriers to finding health information for Hispanics 
in our community?” (see Mathiesen, 2014 for more examples). The model 
of access as a multifaceted relation between persons and information can 
then be used to evaluate the accessibility of information. Given the rela-
tional nature of access, it is important to keep in mind that information 
may be made more accessible by addressing either the resource side or 
the seeker side of the equation. For example, the intellectual barrier of 
illiteracy can be addressed by providing information in nontextual for-
mats and by providing literacy education. The availability facet may be 
addressed by information services taking a role in authoring or publishing 
needed information. 
The third lesson that can be drawn from the framework of informa-
tional justice is that the just distribution of information also requires the 
just treatment of persons and communities as sources and subjects of 
information. By seeking to include more voices within the information 
environment, LIS professionals and organizations help ensure that com-
prehensible and usable information will be available to all members of 
the community. By seeking to ensure that persons and communities are 
accurately and diversely depicted within the information environment, 
LIS professionals can make a significant impact on the perceptions and 
expectations that shape the opportunities of marginalized members of 
the community. Finding ways in which a diverse array of members of mar-
ginalized and stigmatized communities can work with LIS professionals in 
building diverse and accurate representations is one means to correct for 
unconscious biases and stereotypes. In this regard it is essential that the 
LIS profession itself strive for diversity along multiple dimensions.
Conclusion
Drawing from the disciplinary literatures in both LIS and philosophy, this 
article presented a conceptual framework for understanding social justice 
as related to LIS. The following summarizes the basic principles of this 
framework: 
•	 Social	justice	orientation	includes	both	an	institutional	perspective	and	
an ethic of care, solidarity, and respect.
•	 Social	justice	is	concerned	with	issues	of	distribution,	participation,	and	
recognition.
•	 Informational	justice	requires	that	persons	be	treated	justly	as	seekers,	
sources, and subjects of information. 
•	 In	these	roles,	persons	deserve	iDistributive,	iParticipatory,	and	iRecog-
nitional justice.
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•	 These	three	forms	of	informational	justice	are	interdependent	and	mu-
tually supporting.
•	 iDistributive	justice	concerns	the	distribution	of	access	to	information.
•	 Access	 to	 information	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 some	 information	
source or service and a person or group of persons. 
•	 Information	is	accessible	when	it	is	available,	findable,	reachable,	com-
prehensible, and usable. 
•	 A	just	distribution	of	information	is	one	that	ensures	that	all	persons	
have a sufficient level of access to information.
•	 In	seeking	a	sufficient	level	of	access,	we	should	focus	on	information	
that supports and enhances people’s capabilities. 
There is more work to be done on the theory of informational justice, 
both in the realm of theory and in the realm of practice. In addition to 
presenting the overall framework of informational justice, this article 
focused primarily on iDistributive justice. While there was not space to 
develop them here, two other foci of informational justice—iParticipa-
tion and iRecognition—deserve equally careful conceptual development. 
Future theoretical work will expand on these concepts, providing detailed 
frameworks similar to that here developed for iDistributive justice. An-
other important feature of the framework presented here is what was 
called the “social justice orientation.” More needs to be said about how 
this orientation plays out in the LIS professions. Finally, in order to be 
at all relevant, this framework should be applied in varied LIS settings. 
As a philosopher of LIS, the author must leave that work to information 
research professionals and empirical researchers, who she hopes will find 
this framework useful. 
Notes
1.	 This	literature	review	is	limited	to	works	that	explicitly	use	the	term	“social	justice.”	Once	
social justice has been explicitly defined, as I attempt to do in this essay, it should be pos-
sible to offer a broader literature review that includes all works that focus on social justice 
issues, even ones that do not specifically use the term. 
2. While it is important to specify where attention should be focused in addressing social 
injustice, no list can capture all disadvantaged or oppressed social positions in all cultures 
or contexts. New forms of social domination and exclusion may emerge, and hidden forms 
may come to light. For example, while the importance of ensuring accessibility for persons 
with	physical	disabilities	has	become	a	more	central	issue	(Dobransky	&	Hargittai,	2006;	
Goggin	&	Newell,	2003),	persons	with	mental	disabilities	and	mental	illnesses	are	not	
typically included within discussions of accessibility (Ridella, 2014). 
3. This list does not necessarily identify all possible approaches, just some of the most com-
monly discussed ones.
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